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Abstract
In  1996 Ghana privatized  its incumbent  weak and  relatively  ineffective.  The sustainability  of
telecommunications  firm  by selling 30 percent  of Ghana  competition  is unclear.  The  government ended Telekom
Telecom to Telekom  Malaysia,  licensing a second  Malaysia's  management  of Ghana Telecom  and has
network operator,  and allowing  multiple mobile firms  to  invited  Norway's Telenor as a strategic  partner. What
enter the market.  The reforms yielded  mixed results.  this means  in practice  remains unclear,  and the process
Landline  telephone  penetration  increased  dramatically  for selecting Telenor lacked  any transparency.
while the number of mobile subscribers surpassed  even  Meanwhile,  some of the mobile firms are in  precarious
this higher level  of fixed line subscribers.  On the other  financial  positions. Competition  is still  relatively strong,
hand, the network did not reach  the levels  the  but its sustainability  will depend on  the government's
government  hoped,  the second network  operator  never  future commitment  to ensuring it.
really got off the ground,  and the regulator  remained
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2I.  Introduction
A great deal of research has found that competition in telecommunications  has improved
performance  over monopoly provision around the world, resulting in lower prices, better service,
wider access and faster expansion of capacity (Fink, et al. 2002; Li and Xu 2001; Noll 2000; Ros
1999;  Wallsten 2001; Wellenius and Stem 1994).  These findings are consistent with the notion
that technological progress, diseconomies  of scale in management,  and inefficient  operation of
firms not subject to the discipline of competition will offset any scale economies  in the sector.
While the benefits of competition  in telecommunications  have been demonstrated  in
numerous settings, achieving and sustaining it are not easy.  As we discuss below, political
conditions must be met for reforms to be successful, and institutions that can nurture competition
must function effectively.  Unfortunately, Africa's frail political systems are especially
vulnerable  to opposition from interests who stand to lose from competition, while weak
regulatory capacity raises doubts that a level playing field for competitors can be enforced.
Moreover, government's need to raise revenues from the sale and concern  about potential
accusations of "giving away the crown jewels" may favor granting an exclusivity period to the
incumbent operator to increase the proceeds from privatization.  Investors who perceive high risk
or reformers who perceive the need to cross- subsidize investment to expand access to the poor
might also favor monopoly over competition.
Ghana provides a good case for examining the effort to introduce competition  in a weak
institutional  setting.  In December 1996 Ghana partially privatized its incumbent
telecommunications  firm, Ghana Telecom,  and sold a license to another investor to build a
competing  telecom network.  While head to head competition for basic services had been
discussed theoretically,  it had rarely been attempted in  developing  countries.  Competition
between such networks was considered difficult to achieve in most settings and impossible in
Africa, with its large investment needs and perceived high risk.  Moreover, a competing cellular
firm had begun operations in 1992, a second mobile operator entered in 1995, and a third in
1996.
This case study will explore the effects of competition on telecommunications
performance in Ghana.  It first analyzes the circumstances  in the telecommunications  sector prior
to reform and documents in Section III the historical and macro-economic  circumstances  leading
to the privatization decision.  Section IV describes the initial design of the reform and its
3implementation and in Section V we consider whether competition is likely to be sustained.
Section VI assesses the outcomes, including the political and institutional  factors that may
explain the results.  Section VII concludes with an assessment of how well the case substantiates
our premise and what the implications of the findings are for policy.
II.  Sector Conditions Leading to Reform
While most analyses evaluate  sector performance  after reforms, it is important to
recognize that performance  also affects the decision to reform and to introduce competition  in
the first place.  Where access has been constrained and service poor, the public tends to have
little sympathy for the incumbent, making competition more popular.  Meanwhile,  an
unprofitable incumbent requires subsidies from the government, making privatization and
competition potentially more palatable to the government, as well.
Conditions in Ghana's telecom sector increased the chances of introducing competition.
First, the incumbent, Ghana Post and Telecommunications  Corporation  (GP&T), was notably
inefficient, offering considerably poorer services than were available in many of its African
neighbors. Second, while the firm posted accounting  profits, large foreign exchange  losses led to
declining  equity.  Moreover, real local tariffs, already heavily subsidized through high long-
distance and international charges,  were declining rapidly and required increasing direct
government transfers.  Thus, while the bureaucracy was reluctant to cede control of GP&T, the
altemative would ultimately have put the govemment in the position of increasing consumer
tariffs in order to keep the company afloat, which was politically unpopular.  Finally, control of
the firm and regulation of the sector was dispersed across the government,  exacerbating the
problems listed above, but also increasing the likelihood of reform by making any given agency
less likely to oppose reform.
(i)  Service before Reform.  A history of poor telecommunications  service,  including lack
of access, poor quality for those who had access, and high intemational  tariffs made the
incumbent provider unpopular.  Before the sector was restructured  in  1992, the state-owned
GP&T had almost a complete monopoly over all telecommunications  services.'  Compared to
A few corporate  private networks were allowed to operate, but even those were "regulated"  by GP&T, which
4other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, which were themselves poor' performers  compared to*
other developing  countries, telephone penetration rates in Ghana were low and stagnant (Figure 1
and Figure 2).  Only three out of every 1,000 inhabitants had access to a phone in their homes or
businesses.  From 1980 to 1993,  the number of telephone  main lines increased by only  1,000 a
year on average, and from  1981 to  1987, the total actually declined (WB STP completion report).
Payphones were almost non-existent:  Ghana had only 25 payphones  in 1993,  all in Accra
(Anderson Management  International A'S 1993).
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required corporations operating  such networks  to pay GP&T exorbitant  "by-pass" fees.
5Service was highly skewed towards Accra and other urban areas (Figure 3).  Over 80
percent of all phone lines were in urban areas (Intemational  Telecommunications  Union 1994)
and 53.6%  were in Accra in 1990 (PORSPI,  1993). The northem part of the country, with 40
percent of the population,  had only about one percent of the nation's telephones (fewer than six
lines per 10,000 people) in  1993.  Only 37 of the  110 district capitals were connected, meaning
that large parts of the country were not connected to the commnunications  grid at all.
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Stagnant growth was not due to lack of demand.  Demand estimates varied widely but
were all well above GP&T's service provision.  In 1990 GP&T estimated excess demand at
about 12,000 lines, or about 25 percent of main lines, while in 1993  a consultant report estimated
excess demand at 150,000, or three times the existing number of lines (Anderson Management
International  A/S 1993).  By 1985 the Intemational Telecommunications  Union (ITU) estimated
that at the then-current rate of line growth it would take 80 years to connect everyone on the
telephone waiting list.  The waiting time dropped after that partly because  expansion of the
system resumed, but also because discouraged customers removed their names from the waiting
list (Figure 4).2  Further evidence of excess demand was the emergence of so-called
2  The sharp increase in the list after waiting times fell in 1994 (Figure 4), is indicative of the number of customers
who were not on the waiting list out of despair of ever receiving  a phone.
6"Communication Centers."  These centers, principally located in urban areas, sold the use of
phone and fax lines to the public at prices as much as ten times higher than the GP&T's tariff.
Figure 4:  Waiting Time and Waiting List for Main Lines













I  I  :;~~  I  I
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
Source:  Authors'  estimation based on  ITU Data (for waiting time), ITU (for waiting list)
The range of value-added services offered by GP&T was limited because the company
had not invested in the necessary infrastructure (Ampah,  1997).  Even in the late 1980's firms in
Ghana relied largely on telex machines because the unreliable lines could not support fax
machines.  Poor quality motivated larger firms, inc luding parastatals such as the ports and
harbor authority, the railway,  and the electricity companies, to invest heavily in their own private
communications networks.
GP&T's failure to expand was also not initialIly the result of lack of funds: the company
had borrowed heavily from foreign aid sources for investment.  Rather; the problem was
inefficiency  and poor management.  For example, the World Bank and multilateral donors made
available US$173 million for telecommunications  investment in  1988, but the project was
completed in 1994-three and a half years behind schedule.  GP&T's high investment costs also
meant that available funds purchased less new infrastructure than it could have elsewhere.  The
ITU estimated Ghana's cost per main line added to be $3,624 in the early  1990's, which is below
7the African average of $6,200 per line but well above the average for developing countries of
$1,500 (Laidlaw, et al.  1995).
When service was available, quality was very poor.  On average, nearly 20 percent of all
mainlines were not functioning at any time (Anderson  1993).  Only 47 percent of outgoing
international calls were completed while just 21 percent of incoming calls got through in 1992
(World Bank 1997).  Domestic service was not much better; 49 percent of long distance  calls and
58 percent of local calls were completed that same year (Ibid.).  GP&T's poor service was partly
the result of mismanagement,  but incompatible infrastructure was also responsible.  Donor
countries, which had funded most of GP&T's investment,  often required their funds to be used to
purchase equipment manufactured in the donor's country.  As a result, GP&T had switches from
six different manufacturers.  This contributed  to long repair times and high maintenance  costs
(Anderson Management  International A/S  1993).
The company was heavily over-staffed,  slow to respond to consumer complaints,  and
employees frequently demanded side payments to repair faults when they did respond (field
interviews).  In 1994 GP&T had  13 mainlines per employee in the telecommunications  part of its
business, well below the Africa regional average of about 25 (Figure 5) and only a fraction of
this efficiency measure in other developing countries: East Asia averaged 77 mainlines per
employee and Latin America averaged  119 (Calculated using ITU data).
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8(ii) Finances. Financial factors also favored privatization  and competition in Ghana.
GP&T was not the "cash cow" that telecommunications  monopolies were in some developing
countries; hence, the government did not have much to lose in terms of revenue.  To the contrary,
the government was transferring money to GP&T.  While GP&T routinely reported profits, these
were largely the result of questionable accounting  practices, such as reporting financial losses as
negative "capital reserves"  and not including them in the P&L statement.  Table 1 shows
GP&T's declared profits in line one, and actual profits after adjustment for exchange losses in
line two.  The table also shows that GP&T paid essentially no taxes or dividends to the
government.
Table  1: Ghana Telecom: Financial Indicators (in millions of Cedis)
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
Declared profit  2,026  3,293  6,202  (54,134)  (77,188)
Actual profit'  (9,260)  (18,400)  (40,043)  (54,134)  (77,188)
Dividend  0  0  0  0  0
Corporate taxes paid  0  0  0  0  0
Source: Ghana Telecommunications  Company Ltd., Annual  Reports  1991-1997
1.  Declared profit is adjusted for foreign exchange:  losses, which were put in  a separate account until 1993.
Moreover,  the losses in Table  1 are understated because they do not fully account for the
many customers who were not paying their bills.  According to a 1992 consultant report,
GP&T's commercial  department did not routinely update payment records and did not even track
government  non-payment, so the company could not accurately  determine who had actually paid
its bills (Nepostel  1992).  In 1992,  for example,  accounts receivable averaged 252 days and 69
percent of recorded sales.
Figure 6: Real Average International and Domestic
Long distance Tariffs Index (lines  overlap)
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Telecommunication  Charge Regulation (1993  &  1996)]for years, obviously leading to declines  in real rates.  This problem affected all rates,  including
long-distance and international calls, which ostensibly were used to cross-subsidize  low local
tariffs (see Table 2).  Putting aside the issue of the inefficiency of cross-subsidies,  these real
declines meant that ever-increasing  subsidies had to come from government  revenues.
Table 2:  Ghana Telecom Real Tariffs* (in USD, Base=1995)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
1.  Domestic call charges
A. Local (per unit)'  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.16  0.12  0.08
B. Calls to mobile/ 3 M  n/a  n/a  n/a  1.40  1.07  0.75
C. Long distance/3 M'
0 - 32 Iam  0.08  0.07  0.06  0.23  0.18  0.12
32 - 80 km  0.20  0.17  0.15  0.39  0.30  0.21
80- 160 km  0.29  0.24  0.21  0.62  0.48  0.33
> 160 km  0.41  0.34  0.31  0.78  0.60  0.42
2. Intemational Calls/Min'
UK  2.20  1.83  1.65  2.33  1.79  1.25
USA  3.85  3.21  2.89  2.33  1.79  1.25
India  3.63  3.03  2.72  3.72  2.86  2.00
Japan  4.55  3.79  3.41  3.72  2.86  2.00
Brazil  3.63  3.03  2.72  3.72  2.86  2.00
Australia  3.63  3.03  2.72  3.72  2.86  2.00
Nigeria  3.63  3.03  2.72  1.86  1.43  1.00
3. Annual Rental charges
4
Business  20.34  16.94  15.34  18.61  14.32  10.00
Residential  10.77  8.97  8.07  18.61  14.32  10.00
4. Main lines installation
23.92  19.93  17.93  77.53  59.65  41.65
charges
Source: Staff Appraisal  Report, Second Telecommunications  Project,  Republic of Ghana,
1988  [from  1990 to 1992], Post and Telecommunications  Charge Regulation, Republic
of Ghana,  1993, Ghana Telecom License,  1996
*The Real tariff is estimated by deflating the nominal tariff using GDP deflator and by
converting it to USD at 1995 constant exchange rate.
1.  Unit = a call with unlimited time from  1990 to  1992,  5 minutes  from  1993 to 1995
and 4 minutes from  1996 to 1998
2. The domestic long distance tariffs are for operator-connected  peak-time calls with STD  facility. Non-peak
time calls and calls without STD facility are about 24% and  15% cheaper,  respectively.
3.  International tariffs are for operator-assisted  calls. IDD calls are 20 35% cheaper than operator-assisted
calls. For example, IDD calls to US  and UK cost Cedis 2,600 (US$ 1.12 or US$ 0.18 in real terms) in  1998.
4. The charges are for automatic main lines within 3 km of exchange area. Beyond 3 krm, the charge increases
in proportion  to distance.
10Finally, losses also resulted from the compamy's high level of debt service denominated
in foreign currency, which made it vulnerable  to currency fluctuations, especially  since
parastatals  lacked the authority or capacity to hedge.  Almost all of GP&T's capital expenditures
were financed by multilateral and bilateral aid from the World Bank, Japan, France and the
Netherlands, complemented by government loans.  Figure 7 shows GP&T's increasing negative
net worth as a percentage  of its total assets, the product of foreign exchange losses much larger
than equity.  The company was not fully servicing its debt and by 1996 had accrued loan service
payments totaling Cedis  105 billion.
Figure 7: Ghana Telecom - Net Worth as Percentage of Total Assets
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Source: Ghana Telecom Ltd.
(iii) Responsibility  for Regulation  Responsibility for regulation of GP&T was divided,
with many overlapping  oversight agencies.  Three different agencies-the Ministry of Transport
and Communications (MOTC), the Ministry of Finance and the Ghana Frequency  Regulation
and Control Board (GFRCB)-were  formally responsible for various aspects of firm operations.
In addition, the firm itself was the telecommunication  regulator and had responsibility  over some
of its own actions.  Table 3 gives a sense of the multiple regulatory roles.  The table does not
include the Ministry of Finance, which supervised GP&T's budget, borrowing and performance
contract, among other things.Table 3 : Key Regulatory Tasks and Regulators
Regulatory Tasks  Formal Regulator
Licenses:  A. General  MOTC
B. Frequency  GFRCB
Tariffs:  A. Service charges  GP&T, MOTC
B. Frequency charges  GFRCB
Allocation  of number services  GP&T, MOTC
Frequency regulation  GFRBC
Type approval  GP&T, GFRBC
Interconnect agreements  MOTC, GP&T
Arbitration  MOTC, GP&T
Internadonal regulatory cooperation  MOTC, GP&T, GFRCB
Legal means of enforcement  MOTC, GP&T, GFRCB
Advisory function vis a vis MOTC  None/GP&T
Source:  adapted from Andersen,  1993.
GFRCB: Ghana Frequency Registration  and Control Board  MOTC:  Ministry of Transport and Communication
GP&T:  Ghana Post and Telecommunication  Corporation  PO:  Private Operators
These multiple oversight agencies slowed procurement procedures and tariff adjustments,
and reduced accountability and transparency in decision-making.  This structure,  however, also
meant that no single, powerful bureaucratic  actor had such a large stake in GP&T that it might
oppose privatization or competition.
By the early 1  990s some tangible factors  encouraging reforms existed in Ghana: an
inefficient incumbent monopoly that provided extremely limited service of poor quality where it
existed at a growing financial loss to the government, large unmet demand for even the poor
services available, and a government oversight structure that minimized the potential loss to any
particular agency that might be hurt by privatization.  Still, those factors were only part of the
story.  As we discuss below, several political conditions had to be met before reform could be
considered an attractive option to Ghanaian policymakers.
III.  Political Conditions Leading to Reform
While the physical and financial condition of Ghana's telecommunication  sector favored
reform, the decision to reform also depends on political conditions.  In general, reform occurs
only when three conditions  are met: it is politically desirable, in that the political benefits from
12reform are greater than the political costs; it is politically feasible, meaning the reformers are
able to implement the reform and overcome opposition and; it is credible to investors, workers
and other actors (World Bank 1995).  Reform is politically desirable when the groups that benefit
from the status quo and have the power to block reform lose influence.  This can happen because
of a change in the ruling regime or coalition or from a shock such as hyperinflation that lowers
the benefits from the status quo or raises the cost of not reforming.  Reform becomes politically
feasible when the leadership  can secure the support of other parts of the government whose
cooperation  is necessary for success and can withstand any opposition to reform.  Reform is
credible when the leadership's  promises to investors are believable, perhaps because of the
government's reputation, or the existence of credible enforcement  mechanisms or restraints on
policy reversal.
This section first examines how crisis contributed to political change in Ghana, and
analyzes what ultimately made telecommunications  privatization and competition politically
desirable, feasible, and credible.
(i) Crisis and  Reforn.  Drazen and Easterly (2001) find evidence that a severe macro-
economic crisis with hyperinflation can induce substantial reforms.  Indeed,  such conditions
preceded a change in policy direction in Ghana.  II December  1981  Flight-lieutenant Jerry
Rawlings led a military-backed coup-d'etat,  which overthrew the constitutionally  elected
government  and established the rule of the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC).  The
PNDC was a coalition of various class and political groupings ranging from Marxist-oriented
revolutionary groups such as the New Democratic  Movement (NDM) and The June 4th
Movement, to elements of previously pro-capitalist parties such as the United National
Convention (UNC),  PNP,  and the Popular Front Party (PFP).  The PNDC introduced  extensive
wage and price controls, primarily to win the support of urban workers.  While perhaps
politically popular, this move accelerated  an already-persistent economic  decline.  The situation
was compounded by severe (interrelated)  crises in 1983  that included runaway inflation,  draught,
capital flight, extensive brain drain, and the forced repatriation of nearly  1.2 million Ghanaians
from Nigeria.
The severity of this crisis and the weakening  of the hard-line revolutionary groups  within
the coalition allowed the Rawlings government to implement IMF and World Bank Structural
Adjustment Programs (SAP) and expand beyond its original base of support in the military,
13workers and some rural populations.  The SAP included, among other measures, devaluing the
Cedi by 300 percent against the dollar, curbing public spending, and eliminating 6,000 price
controls (Herbst  1991).  These policies had a rapid effect on inflation, which fell to below 40
percent a year by  1984, and the fiscal deficit, which dropped to about one percent of GDP in
current prices (Figure 8 and 9).
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Figure 9: Government Deficit as Percentage of GDP
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14Although the PNDC did not eliminate its anti-capitalist rhetoric,  the government
continued its pragmatic policy in the late 1980's, including cost recovery for public services and
divestiture of state-owned enterprises (Nugent  1996).  Politically the country was more stable,
and the number of attempted coups began to decline.
Judging from its policies, the Rawlings government no longer needed to woo urban
workers, who had been early supporters.  The cost of the government's pragmatic policies after
1983 fell most heavily on urban wage earners, including employees of state-owned enterprises.
Formal sector employment fell by 60 percent from 1985 to  1991, and prices for food and other
consumables rose in urban areas with the end of price controls.  The government also curbed the
power of unions by breaking strikes and manipulating elections of union officials  (Nugent 1996).
In this context of radical reforms throughout the economy, changes in the telecom
sector-one of the most visible parts of the economy-were  not far behind.  We next discuss
political factors that specifically impacted telecommnunications.
(ii) Political  Desirability  of Telecommunications Reform.  Several factors worked to
increase the potential political benefits of reforms, while the political costs remained low.  In the
late 1980's under domestic and international pressure, the Rawlings government began to restore
democracy,  starting with popularly elected District Assemblies in 1988-89.  As it became clear
that the PNDC would be likely to win a popular election, further steps were taken.  A new
constitution creating a democratically elected president and unicameral parliament was approved
by plebiscite in April  1992.  In preparation for the election the PNDC transformed itself into a
political party, the National Democratic Congress or NDC (Nugent  1996).
In the  1992 elections Rawlings carried all regions except Ashanti and was elected by
about 58 percent of the total vote (Jeffries and Thornas  1993).3  He did least well in Accra (53%)
and lost some other major urban-industrial  areas, such as Tema West and Sekondi, but won
heavily in rural areas.  The opposition political party, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) had a core
constituency of Ashanti, but also won the support of most business groups, and garnered about
30 percent of the vote.
3Although there were widespread accusations  of fraud and reported irregularities, Nugent  1996 argues that the final
outcome would not have been very different with free and fair election practices, although Rawlings would probably
not have won on the first ballot.  In the  1996 elections, which are generally regarded as honest, President Rawlings
won with a similar percentage of the vote.
15Telecommunications  privatization became politically desirable to the Rawlings
administration  after the election for several reasons.  First, privatization  was seen as a way to
attract private capital to eventually bring communications  to NDC constituents  in the rural areas.
Second, the administration wanted to correct the deficiencies  in the communications  system that
threatened to derail the govemment's  economic reforms and harm the President's  popularity in
thel 996 elections.  In particular, the administration wanted to improve  infrastructure  in order to
attract new private investment.  The government had spent heavily in the run up to elections,
contributing to the rise in the public sector deficit and up-tick in inflation shown in Figure  8 and
Figure 9.
The Rawlings  administration hoped that private investment would accelerate growth  at
the same time that govermnent  cut spending to restore fiscal discipline.4 There was evidence that
problems  in telecommunications  were impeding new private investment.  A number of
prominent investors, such as Coca Cola, had decided not to locate in Ghana and had specifically
mentioned  its poor communications  infrastructure  as a factor (Field interview  1998).
A third factor explaining the telecommunications  reform was the size of the gap between
supply and demand.  Govenmment officials considered the gap to be so large that it would be
impossible to finance  the necessary investment out of public sources according to the then
Minister of Communications (Salia  1993).  The Ministry was projecting that demand would
reach between 300,000 and 500,000 lines by the end of the century, compared to a network of
less than 50,000, growing at a rate of about 1,000  lines a year.  At GP&T's average costs per
new line, this would require an investment of about $1 billion, about equivalent to the country's
total investment of any kind in 1992 (Laidlaw, et al.  1995).
In contrast to high expected benefits, the political costs of privatization appeared  to be
low to President Rawlings.  The main opponents were the workers and managers of GP&T.  The
PNDC had always been critical of the performance  of Ghana's parastatals and earlier attempts to
reform them under state ownership had been disappointing (Nugent  1996).  Moreover, as we
have seen, the workers were not part of the PNDC's constituency.  The govemment regarded the
management of Ghana Telecom as entrenched bureaucrats who were incapable of responding to
expanding demand (field interviews).  While no polling data are available, most people consulted
4 The govemment's stated goal was a real increase of 8 percent a year in GDP by the  late 1990's, compared to an
average of about 5 percent during form  1990-1993.
16for this study, while expressing general concern about the sale of national assets to foreign
nationals, agreed that GP&T's history of poor performance  made its privatization popular and
introduction of competition less controversial.  There was little support for the workers, who as
we mentioned, were a cause of complaints.  Since most people did not have a telephone, there
was also less concern among the public about how a sale might affect tariffs.
What explains the political desirability of competition?  One reason already discussed
was the small scale of the existing network, plus the fact that GP&T had been a drain on the
treasury.  Under those circumstances it seemed unlikely that GP&T's assets would command a
large enough price, even with exclusivity, to make up for the potential  costs of a monopoly.
Second, although the inner workings of the NDC are not well documented,  at the time of reform
several powerful men were  vying for the President's  favor.  The President appeared to shift his
support to avoid any one individual or faction from becoming dominant.5 This situation favored
competition, which would allow rents to be contested among several rivals.
A third factor favoring competition was GP&T's poor track record in providing access to
rural or poorer urban areas, despite the large cross subsidies.  We might otherwise have expected
that the NDC's interest in increasing rural access to telecommunications  would have made
competition less politically desirable, as long as politicians believed that cross-subsidies were
necessary to reach under-served communities.  Competition is incompatible with cross subsidies
because new entrants drive down the prices of wealthier users or more costly services to market
levels. The government expected that access would expand at least as fast with competition as
with a cross subsidy if a levy on all telecom users could be used to fund uneconomical services
(called GIFTEL).
(iii) Political  Feasibility  of Telecommunications Reform.  For a reform to be politically
feasible, reformers have to secure the support and approvals  necessary to enact the reform and
overcome opposition (World Bank 1995).  Telecom reform was feasible in Ghana because after
the 1992 presidential elections, the opposition claimed widespread fraud and boycotted the
parliamentary  elections that followed (Nugent 1996).  As a result, President Rawlings had a full
majority  in Parliament during his first term and ccimplete control of  his cabinet.  Hence, his
5  There are several possible reasons for such shifts.  One reason may have been that the President was trying to
prevent ethnic rivalries from becoming important  in politics (Laidlaw,  et al 1995).  Another possibility is that this
was a method to reduce the risk that a dominant or disgruntled group would attempt to seize power in a coup.
17administration could pass and implement the necessary legislation to privatize
telecommunications  and introduce competition.
In addition, any opposition to the reform could be withstood.  GP&T's workforce  were
not constituents  of the government, so their main threat would be to disrupt the sale and the
economy by strikes.  Although the govemment had taken a number of steps to reduce union
power in the mid-1980's,  including reorganizing the Industrial  and Commercial Workers Union,
strikes were a real threat.  To overcome worker opposition, the government negotiated with the
union to allow 474 workers to be laid off for cause in exchange for a promise of no
retrenchments  as a result of  privatization.  They also promised that workers would eventually
receive shares  in GT (field interviews, EIU)
(iv) Credibility.  Privatization with competition must pass a higher credibility hurdle than
with monopoly.  A buyer in Ghana's competitive telecom market would have to compete with a
new, second network operator as well as three cellular companies.  At the same time the investor
would also have to replace and repair an unknown fraction of GP&T's assets and tolerate  a high
rate of over-staffing.  Under these circumstances,  there was concem that foreign investors would
regard the purchase of the incumbent as too risky and shun the bidding or offer a very low price.
On the other hand, the perceived risks of telecommunications  investment were declining, thus
reducing the credibility hurdle.  Advances in technology and declines in wireless costs reduced
not only the dollar amount of investment required to roll out a given system, but also the amount
that is sunk in fixed wire and similar immovable assets. For example,  fixed cellular costs in sub-
Saharan Africa declined from US$5,000 per subscriber  in 1985 to US$500 by 1996 (ITU 1996).
Privatization was credible to investors for several reasons.  First, Ghana was perceived as
less likely to expropriate private assets than many of its neighbors in Africa.  Its ratings in the
International Country Risk Guide had improved since the 1980's and were high by the time of
privatization  (Figure 10).  Although the Rawlings administration had expropriated  the assets of
Ghanaian investors in the past (World Bank 1995),  it had respected the property rights of foreign
investors, largely stuck to its pragmatic reform program and privatized other important state-
owned enterprises, such as the Ashanti Goldfields, so its reputation was improving.  The return
to democracy  introduced checks  on arbitrary government  action that provided further safeguards
to investors. A third source of credibility  was that investors believed that they could protect
18themselves  from regulatory expropriation by allying themselves with powerful champions with
ties to high government officials  (field interviews).
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A fourth factor was the government's agreement to take over GT's old debt, which meant
that an efficiently operated GT could earn a good return at current prices and compete.  Finally,
the Rawlings administration had close ties with the Malaysian  government, which may have
encouraged Telekom Malaysia (the largest component of the consortium that purchased a
minority share of GT) to participate, although these close ties may also have deterred other firms
from bidding.
IV.  Reform Objectives and Methods
In this section we describe the stated objectives  for the reform, the changes that were
introduced, and the privatization  transaction.  We show that competition was a stated objective of
the reform, but that neither the transaction nor the legal structure of the regulation achieved the
original intent of a highly competitive  sale or a level playing field.  The next section analyzes the
outcomes.
(i) Objectives of  Reform.  Reforms were introduced gradually starting in 1992 when
cellular entry was allowed.  Competition began in a iairly ad hoc fashion with no intent to
challenge the incumbent.  Initially, mobile entry was allowed without charge and with minimum
19regulation.  Multiple licenses for cellular were awarded in 1992, although only one firm,
Mobitel, began operations in 1992-93.  A second mobile operator, Celltel, began in  1995.  The
third entrant, Spacefon,  paid the government US$500,000 in order to enter the market and began
operations  in 1996.  All three mobile operators  developed interconnection agreements with GT
through bilateral negotiations  facilitated by the government.
The government stated its telecommunications  objectives  in the Accelerated
Development Program (ADP) for 1994-2000 (Government of Ghana, Ministry of Transport and
Communications,  1994).  The ADP followed an extensive process of consultation during 1993-
94 that brought together telecom service providers, policy makers, financiers,  donors  and, to a
lesser extent, users.  It was also influenced by a consultant's report (Anderson Management
International A/S  1993) that strongly recommended privatization and competition.
The ADP assumed competition would result in improved access, reliability, and quality
of services.  It called for competition from a second network operator (SNO)  and expansion of
mobile services,  as well as no restriction on private networks, "a liberal policy towards the
authorization of value added services," and a promise to allow operators to recover the full cost
of service provision while offering competitive  prices to customers.  Provision was made for a
single regulatory body to regulate the sector under "the direction for the Ministry [of
Communications]  on policy."  Although the ADP did not mandate universal access, it did call for
one payphone  in every village of more than 500 people.  The ADP focused on business
consumers, with the objective of enhancing "Ghana's  competitive advantage in the region
through  the provision of high quality communications  services to businesses."
(ii) The Transaction. The sale of GT and the  SNO license was carefully planned.  In
1995 Ghana Telecom (GT) was incorporated as a public limited liability company and separated
from postal services.  (Also that year, value added services were liberalized.)  Legislation to
regulate  the privatized GT and SNO was passed in  1996.  The licenses set network expansion
(Table 4) and quality of service targets for the two operators that were estimated to require a total
capital investment of about US$500 million.  There were no universal  service obligations,
although the two national operators were asked to inform the regulator of intended expansion
into rural areas so these would not be targeted for other operators.  In addition, as we mentioned,
it was agreed that GT would not lay off workers to reduce  the workforce.  The two operators
20would be given a five-year exclusive duopoly over fixed voice telephony and international voice
gateways.
Table 4.  Expansion and Service Requirements for Basic  Service PTOs
1997  1998  1999  :2000  2001
Expansion Targets
a) New lines
GT  25,000  50,000  50,000  50,000  50,000
SNO  n/a  n/a  50,000 by 1999  n/a  n/a
b) Payphones
GT  300  300  300  300  300
SNO  100  100  100  100  100
Service Quality Targets'
a) Faults per 100 lines (%)  5%  4.5%  4.5%  4.5%
b) Faults repaired in <48 hrs (%)  50%  60%  70%  80%
c) Call Completion  rates
Local  75%  78%  81%  85%
70%  75%  80%/  80%
National  long dist.
50%  65%  70%  70%
Intemational
d) Average Operator Response  10  8  6  5
time (seconds)
Source:  GT and  SNO Licenses,  1997 (for all  Margal)  and  UT and Weatel  (for achil  hgi3
'Same for GT and SNO.
After an extensive road show, twelve firms pre-qualified to bid on either of the two
licenses and paid a commitment fee of US$5,000 (Table 5)6  To qualify a consortium had to
have an operator with the technical expertise and financial and managerial ability to meet the
targets set for either operator (Ampah  1997).
6  Firms could bid on both licenses but would be awarded only one.
21Table 5. Firms that Pre-Qualified to Bid in Ghana's Telecommunication's  Auction
Telia (Sweden)  Telekom Malaysia
Nepostel (The Netherlands)  African Communications  Group (USA)
Balton / Bezeq (Israel)  Comtech Group (Ghana)
Telekom (South Africa)  Advanced Systems Communications
Spacetel Ghana  Associated Telecom (Ghana)
Volta Communications  (Germany)  Afritel (USA)
Despite this initial show of interest only four consortia chose to submit bids in the final
round, which required a US$ 5 million bid bond.  The sale was therefore less competitive  than
many had hoped.  Some believed that the presence of the SNO reduced interest in GT.  The
evidence, however, suggests that the SNO had little to do with bidder attrition.  Firms stated that
they dropped out because of problems finding financing or suitable local partners (Ampah,  1997
and field interviews).  People involved in the process reported that other factors that may have
influenced the drop out rate were the proximity of the elections  in Ghana, competition from other
African sales (Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal),  and inadequate time for investor due diligence (field
interviews).  Only one bidder complained about the SNO and asked for exclusivity (field
interviews).
Two of the final four bidders  had to be dropped,  one for failing to post the bid bond and
the other because its bond proved to be fraudulent.  This left two bidders for two licenses:  G-com
(Telekom Malaysia and local investors), which bid for both licenses, and African
Communications  Group (ACG and Western Wireless(US)),  which bid for the SNO license only.
G-com was awarded a 30 percent  stake in GT and majority representation  on GT's board, which
gave them management control, for US$38 million.  The price paid for GT was slightly above
the independent valuation prepared by the advisors to the government  (US$ 100 million for the
entire firm).  ACG's outbid G-Com's for the SNO, thus winning the second license for US$10
million on December  16,  1997.
(iii) The Legal Structure of  Regulation.  The December  1996 Act creating the National
Communications  Authority (NCA) gave the regulator considerable authority  including
responsibilities for: granting licenses; allocating and regulating the use of radio frequencies;
setting standards; providing tariff rules and guidelines; and providing advice on policy and
strategy for the sector to the Minister of Communications.  The Act empowered  the NCA to
22require operators to permit interconnection  (by imposing default interconnection agreements  if
necessary), to adhere to specified tariff terms  and conditions, to pay fees to the NCA, to provide
any information the NCA requires, and to operate according to standards set by the NCA.  It also
empowered the NCA to inspect the operators,  as well as issue fines and revoke  licenses for non-
compliance with its rulings.
The Act failed to safeguard the NCA's independence  from politically motivated
intervention.  All members of its Board of Directors were appointed by the President and could
be removed by the President at any time "for stated reasons"  (Republic of Ghana  1996)7.  Board
members are appointed for a term of four years and can be re-appointed upon completion of
term; terms are not staggered. Thus, nothing prevented the President from replacing the board
after each election or whenever he deems advisable.
The NCA's independence  was further weakened by its subservience  to the Minister of
Communications.  The Act specifically empowers the Minister to instruct the NCA: "[The
Minister] may give to the Authority  such directions of a general character as appear to him to be
required in the public interest relating to the discharge of the functions of the Authority"
(Republic of Ghana  1996).  Parties that disagree with a ruling of the NCA must first appeal to the
Minister.  Only if they are unsatisfied with the Minister's ruling can they appeal to the High
Court.
The regulations prepared to accompany'the  act have not yet been passed by Parliament.
The NCA has budgetary autonomy and generates funds by requiring a fixed percentage  of total
turnover of fixed and mobile telephone operators (as stipulated in the license) to be paid by each
operator yearly to NCA to finance its operations.  (A further 1% of turnover is collected for the
Ghana Investment Fund for Telecommunications  (GIFTEL) to promote the development of
telecommunication and promote rural telephony.)  These  funds are as likely to compromise the
NCA's independence as secure it, however,  since they potentially make the agency a relatively
well endowed part of the government and hence a more attractive target for meddling. It is
believed that the control of this account is one of the main incentives that delayed the formation
of the NCA board. Neither the act nor the proposed regulations establish how the NCA will use
7  The Board of Directors is to be made up of:  a Chairman, a Director-General,  a representative of the National
Security Council and four other members with knowledge  of the sector.
23these funds or set a budget,  although the board must present the Minister with an annual report,
which he, in turn, presents to Parliament.
There is no way to assess the full effects of these legislative weaknesses  because to date
the NCA has never functioned  as envisioned in the Act.  As mentioned, the accompanying
regulation necessary to implement the Act has not been passed by Parliament.  Moreover, the
NCA board has been problematic  from the start.  Although names were submitted to the NDC
government  several times, the NCA Board was not named until just prior to the 2000 elections,
meaning that the NCA had no substantive director-general  in its first few years of life.  Even the
Acting Director changed three times within a period of 4 years.  The longest serving acting
director general and several of the staff were retired professionals  from GT, which reduced
NCA's credibility as a neutral regulator in the eyes of some operators consulted for this case
study.  The new government suspended the board appointed in the last days of the Rawlings
administration  and put together a new board, but with the Minister of Communications  as chair,
further compromising the NCA's independence.  As a result the NCA has remained directly
under the direction of the Ministry of Communications, led by interim management,  and
operated without the full complement of trained professionals necessary  to carry out its
responsibilities.8
V.  Reform Outcomes: Progress and Disappointment
When the licenses for GT and the SNO, dubbed "Westel,"  were signed in February  1997,
the stage was set for considerable  competition in the market with three mobile and two fixed
operators.  Given the regulatory weaknesses,  though, it may not come as a surprise that the
results of Ghana's telecom reforms have been mixed so far and future development is uncertain.
We should emphasize that even with the problems that we will discuss below, the sector
is in much better shape than it was before reforms.  Fixed line growth has soared since
privatization,  and even with that growth mobile penetration now exceeds  fixed line penetration.
On the other hand, GT did not reach its expansion targets and the government has abrogated  its
management  agreement with Telekom Malaysia  and is negotiating with a new strategic investor;
Westel (the SNO) is still struggling to truly launch its service; two mobile operators-Celltel  and
s Although the NCA aims to hire about  20 professionals,  it has only 6 on board plus the acting Director.
24Mobitel-are teetering on the edge of dissolution; the regulator is weak and subservient to the
Ministry; and the successful telecom firms now face increased taxes, tariffs, and import delays.
In this section we review events since the reforms, discussing both the improvements  in the
sector and the intense uncertainty now hanging over it.
(i) Telephone penetration
The reforms,produced a rapid growth in fixed lines (Figure  11) from Ghana Telecom.
Several factors contributed  to this growth.  First, much of the expansion was financed with donor
funds, including the World Bank's Second Telecommunications Project that preceded
privatization.  Second, the firm faced the threat of heavy penalties for non-performance.  Third,
for the first time GT faced competition  from rapidly growing mobile services and the threat of
entry by a direct competitor,  Westel.  While donor assistance may have provided much of the
capital for initial expansion,  it is likely that these funds would not have been used for this
purpose in the absence of competition and penalties, given GT's long history of inactivity and
past donor assistance projects that yielded no increase in fixed line growth.  The First
Telecommunications  Project, for example, was nearly seven years behind schedule.  Moreover,
prior to reform GDP growth (the best measure of likely demand) outstripped growth in
telecommunications  supply:  GDP grew by 66 percent  from 1984 to  1995, while the number of
lines in service increased by only 44 percent (CS First Boston 1996).
Figure  11: Real GDP Growth  and Main Telephone Lines Expansion
60
50





1  W3  1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991  1992 1993 1994 1995'  1  996'  1997 1998 1999 2000 200  1
Source:  World Bank,  SIMA (for GDP) and ITU  (for main lines)
25Figure  12: Main Telephone  Lines Per 100 Inhabitants (Ghana vs. SSA)
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As a result of this expansion, mainlines  in service more than doubled in just three years,
from 50 thousand in 1994 to  105.5 thousand in 1997; by early 2002 GT had nearly 240,000  lines
installed.  Ghana not only caught up with its neighbors, but outperformed them (Figure  12).
Ghana's mainline teledensity increased by 287 percent, from about 3 per thousand in 1994 to
11.6 in 2001,  while the average in Sub-Saharan  Africa grew by only 66 percent over the same
period, from 4.7 to 7.8 per thousand (Figure  12).
Figure  13  Comparative Average Annual Main Lines Expansion Rate
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26Other services have also expanded.  The number of public phones operated by GT
increased from just 27 in 1995 to over 4,000 in 2002, well above the target specified in their
license.  The company reports that it expanded payphones rapidly in response to competition, in
particular the pending entry of Westel (field  interviews).
Cellular service, as in much of Africa, is in many ways is responsible for the most
dramatic changes in the sector.  The mobile sector has grown from a single provider in 1993 to
four providers today, with close to 300,000 subscribers  in total.  Figure 14 shows the total
number of telephones in operation  in Ghana, revealing both the sharp growth since reforms as
well as the large share of that growth for which mobiles are responsible.
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(ii) Tariffs.  GT's fixed-line tariffs are regulated and are still subject to long delays
between tariff reviews.  They were initially set in 1996 as part of the privatization  process and
did not change until June 2001 (see Table 6).  The rapid devaluation of the local currency since
1996 resulted in a sharp reduction in real tariffs.  In June 2001, the government approved new
tariffs for GT, though the currency devaluation  continued to erode the new tariffs.  Westel's
tariffs remain unregulated until they have 25 percent of the market, but to compete Westel has no
choice but to match GT's rates.
27Table 6
Ghana Telecom Tariffs
SERVICE  1996-JUNE  2001  As of June 2001
Cedis  1996  Cedi  US$
US Dollars
a) Local  200/4min  0.115  0200/3min  +
100/min  0.014
b) Intemet  (local)  200.00/4min  0.115  0200.00/4min  0.007
TRUNK
0-32 km  80/min  0.046  0 150/min  0.021
32 - 80 km  133/min  0.076  0 200/min  0.029
80-  160km  200/min  0.115  0 300/min  0.043
>  160 km  300/min  0.172  0 450/min  0.064
INTERNATIONAL
Ecowas  2,000/min  1.149  0 2,500/min  0.357
Direct (non-Ecowas)  2,600/min  1.494  0 2,500/min  0.357
Transit  4,000/min  2.299  0 5,500/min  0.789
RENTAL
Fixed  2,500/month  1.437  0 1  0,000/month  1.429
WILL  5,000/month  2.874  0 10,000/month  1.429
Intemet  2,500/month  1.437  0 2,500/month  0.357
The exchange rate in Dec.  1996 was  1740 cedis = US$1
The exchange rate in June 2001  was 7000 cedis = US$1
In contrast, operators reported that competition and the drop in cellular costs were
responsible for drastic declines in tariffs in cellular service (field interviews).  The connection
charge for an analogue phone fell from $750 in  1993/94 to $100 in 1997  below the world
average (Table 6) (Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd.  1997).  The rates were still high compared
to some countries, such as in Latin America, but can be expected to drop further with growth  in
the size of the systems and if competition continues to grow.
28Table 6: Comparison of Analog Cellular Connection Charge  (US$)
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
Ghana  750  750  550  550  100
East Asian Average  329  317  308  277  NR
LAC Average  197  149  118  78  NR
World Average  474  446  421  220  209
World Max  13,431  13,431  13,431  3,846  3,846
WorldMin  4  6  7  7  7
Note: Averages  have been estimated using sanple data. 6 samples for EA,  14 for Latin America & the Caribbean
(LAC) and 69 for World.
Source: World Telecommunications  Indicators Database,  ITU
(iii) Profitability  and  Productivity. GT's solvency has been restored, partly because of
efficiency improvements  and expansion,  and partly because the government absorbed past debts
as part of the privatization.  Labor productivity  in GT is also up (Figure 15) since expansion has
been rapid while the labor force remained largely changed.  Productivity continues to be low by
OECD standards, however, and there is considerable  room for improvement should competitive
pressures continue.
Figure 15: Labor Productivity  in GT
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29(iv) Disappointments
While the sector overall has improved, it has not been as successful as the government
had hoped.  First, Westel never really got off the ground.  After three years of operation it had
only about 2,600 subscribers by the end of 2001.  The company reports that GT worked to ensure
that Westel would never be a real competitor-blocking  its calling card access and making
interconnection  difficult.  Westel appears to have lasted as long as it has because of its primary
valuable asset: one of Ghana's two international voice gateways.
GT asserts that it never blocked interconnection, but that congestion in its network and
switches are to blame.  And, indeed, congestion  is a severe problem-subscribership  has
increased,  especially on mobile networks, as fast as operators install equipment.  Nonetheless,
with a weak regulator GT has every incentive to make interconnection difficult for all potential
competitors that need access to its customers.
Westel's performance,  however, was not the only disappointment.  GT, despite fast
growth, did not meet its fixed line targets either.  The company had promised to reach 300,000
lines by 2002, but only got to 241,000.  The NCA recently imposed a fine of approximately  $US
69 million as a result.  Westel, which was obligated to install 50,000 lines, was fined $US 71.5
million.
Privatization and the threat of competition  has thus far had little effect on access in
underserved areas.  The dramatic expansion  in lines documented above has been almost entirely
concentrated in the greater Accra area.  Although the Government plans to charge all operators
one percent of their revenues for a fund for rural telecommunications,  this fund, called GIFTEL,
is not yet operational. GT and Westel were given the right of first refusal over all regions of the
country during their first two years, after which underserved areas not claimed were to be opened
to competitive bidding. Unfortunately,  while the two years expired, the competitive  bidding
never took place.  One firm, Capital Telecom, was the only bidder on an earlier plan to initiate
service to rural areas in the South. Capital reports one site in service and only several hundred
customers, most of them in district capitals and similar semi-urban areas.
It is too early to judge whether the GIFTEL tax scheme will be more successful at
expanding access than cross subsidies have been.  A number of issues related to GIFTEL have
yet to be resolved.  One is the definition of rural or under-served areas.  Many sites would be part
of any roll out of services  and do not need special support from such telecommunication  taxes.
30Another issue -is administration.  Earmarked  taxes and fees are  notoriously difficult to
administer, since once funds are in government hands they tend to be diverted to other public
expenditures.  However, most countries, including advanced ones such as US and UK collect and
earmark  funds for their universal service programs.  With the NCA functioning as an adjunct of
the Ministry of Communications this risk of misapplying the funds may be higher than if it were
established with its own independent board as the law intended.
While official plans for connecting areas outside the capital have not yet been successful,
some progress has been made.  The largest mobile operator, Scancom Ltd., recently began to
provide coverage in towns across the country.
(v) Elections, a new government, and intense uncertainty
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While the government said it
would honor Telekom Malaysia's 30 percent ownership share, it would no longer permit TM to
hold a controlling majority of the board.  Eventually the Malaysian management was removed
and replaced with an "interim management committee."  This decision was controversial since it
31was not clear that the govermment had the right to unilaterally change the board composition
under the  1996 contract.  When TM won  the original bidding, the government had agreed to
eventually sell an additional  15 percent of GT.  That agreement has also since fallen through, and
TM reportedly wants the government to buy back its 30 percent holding if the government will
not allow it management  control, as per the original contract.
These changes may cause some financial problems, as well.  The International Financial
Corporation (IFC) had approved a $US 100 million loan to GT.  With the government's decision
to end TM's management of GT and general confusion about the firm's future, the IFC cancelled
the loan.  How this cancellation will affect GT's expansion and upgrading remains unclear.
At the same time that it was canceling TM's management control, the government  also
decided to look for a new strategic investor.  The government placed an ad in the local media on
April 9, 2002, with a deadline of April 30 for investors to respond.  Among other conditions, the
government wants the network expanded by 400,000  fixed lines within 2-3 years "in order to
extend telephone  services to every town with a Senior Secondary  School or Teacher Training
College for internet and other applications."  Moreover,  the government  modestly defines a fixed
line as "any technology which allows one to make broadband telephone connection to the
computer so that not only voice, but high speed data transfer, the Internet and other applications
including video streaming can be transmitted at competitive tariff."
In addition to these requirements,  the tender notice also specified that the investor should
develop, "with the co-operation of the Ghanaian authorities,  . . . effective methods for the
investigation of malpractices  in the telecom sector."  This phrase suggests a further blurring of
the lines between an independent regulator and the rest of the sector by-if the statement is taken
at face value-giving the firm powers normally granted to a regulator.
The process for choosing the investor and the nature of the agreement remain shrouded  in
mystery.  By August 2002 the government had announced that it was negotiating with the
Norwegian firm Telenor, but had provided no information on how Telenor was selected, what
they would pay (or be paid), or what role they would play in running the firm.  While a good
outcome  is possible, many have expressed grave concerns over the complete lack of transparency
in the process.
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Whether the sector will become more or less competitive is uncertain  at the moment.
While there are many bright spots, as discussed above, many factors do not bode well for the
future of competition.  In particular, the regulator is still weak and under the control of the
Ministry, GT continues to exercise market power both in interconnection  and in its foray into
mobile services, two of the mobile firms are in a precarious  situation, and all operators face new
obstacles from various levels of government.  We discuss these issues below.
(i)  Weakness of  the Regulator. The NCA does not have the full complement of staff and
expertise to meet its regulatory mandate.  Moreover, the Authority operates with more than the
usual information asymmetry and does not have even the most minimal information it needs to
regulate.  Furthermore, judging from their annual accounts, the amount of  public information
available about GT diminished drastically with privatization,  despite the fact that the incumbent
is 70 percent  state-owned.  In effect GT has been left virtually free from public scrutiny.  As for
the other operators, although they all report complying with regulator's requests (as does GT),
the NCA says that their requests for information are routinely ignored.
The NCA has been unable to resolve major disputes without the intervention of the
Minister. A number of issues dragged on for months and years, during a period when each of the
players are strongly motivated to try to establish monopoly power.  The independence of the
regulatory agency has only decreased with time.  Indeed, the Minister of Communications  is now
the chair of the NCA's board.
The various rivals in telecommunications  have tried to protect their positions by aligning
themselves with politically powerful champions, rather than appealing to the courts for
resolution of their disputes.  Lawsuits are usually a tool of last resort in business, and indeed in
the early years of reform the telecommunications  rivals stated that it would be hard to do
business in Ghana if they pursued their claims in court.  However, the ineffectiveness  of the
regulator and anticompetitive practices by the incumrbent  led many operators to use the courts as
a defense of last resort.  In July 2000, the mobile phone companies and Westel took GT to court
to seek an injunction from the court to prevent GT from launching its mobile phone service until
GT met its interconnection and other requirement to them to facilitate a level playing field. The
case was eventually settled out of court through the help of a Consultant hired by the NCA.  The
33Operators state that the reason why the courts are now being used to settle problems in the sector
is that the operators have lost confidence in both the NCA and the Ministry  to act as impartial
adjudicators.  Thus, the weakness of the NCA undermines  Ghana's progress toward law-based,
rather than influence-based,  rules, and confidence  in the sector.
(ii.) Interconnection. Not surprisingly in the absence of effective regulation, major
disputes have arisen over interconnection.  These disputes center around several  issues:
establishment of nondiscriminatory  terms and conditions, prevention of cross-subsidy between
GT fixed and GT mobile services,  adequate interconnection capacity between networks,
interconnection traffic settlement and rates.  In the latter part of 2000, the NCA, with the
assistance of consultants undertook a major step at resolving some key issues in the sector
including drafting of new licenses  for all operators, revised frequency plans and revision of the
regulations (O'Melveny & Myers LLP 2000).
A follow up to this work was a more detailed look at the protracted  interconnection
problems within the industry.  Among the problems was the lack of a cost based tariff system
and discrepancies  between the traffic measurement of the operators.  This led to the  formation of
an inter-operator  Technical Committee that has become a permanent working committee.
(Benjamin Adu)The  TC was to determine the criteria or methodology  for the measurement of
traffic. All operators were supposed to implement decisions and agreements reached  at Joint
Technical  Committee meetings,  and the NCA was to enforce those decisions.
Interconnection  traffic settlements and rates are time based.  The per minute rates which,
in theory, should cover the cost of the resources required to complete the call through the
network receiving the call.  Interconnection terms and rates strongly influence  a new entrant's
investment decisions.  Unfair terms and high rates will discourage entry or expansion;  indeed
one of the mobile operators, Mobitel,  had at one point suggested it may be forced to exit in part
because of GT's demand that they pay higher interconnection  rates in their sender-takes-all
interconnection agreement, which persisted until 2001.  High rates can also lead to inefficient
investment to bypass interconnection,  as well as high consumer tariffs.  Interconnection charges
that differ for different operators can distort the market. The sender-takes-all  agreement has been
replaced by a fixed per-minute based rate that considers  the network cost.  Under the new
arrangement,  revenues across networks are now split at a 2/3 ratio, where the mobile firm
receives  three cedis for every two cedis the fixed network receives.  In other words, under the
34current tariff of 600 cedis per minute, the fixed operator receives  240 cedis while the mobile
operator receives 360.
(iii) Mobile Competition The recent interconnection agreement may have been facilitated,
in part, by the emergence of a dominant mobile provider.  Scancom Ltd. (Spacefon) had nearly
200,000 subscribers by 2002, and hoped to reach 220,00 by the end of the year (see Figure  16).
As a result of this rapid expansion,  it is as important for GT's customers to be able to reach
Spacefon's customers as vice-versa.  Under these circumstances,  GT has much to lose without a
workable interconnection agreement.
GT, however, is not ready to cede the mobile market.  In 2000 it launched  its own mobile
service-OneTouch.  OneTouch grew quickly, reaching 60,000 customers by the end of 2001.
Growth seemed to be constrained by a lack of switching equipment and from underestimating the
demand for pre-paid,  as opposed to post-paid, services.  OneTouch is supposed to operate as a
completely separate  business unit from the rest of GT.  However, the extent to which they are
actually separate is unclear.  GT's 2000 Annual Report, for example, seems to treat OneTouch as
an integral part of the company.  While more conipetition  is likely to improve the sector, GT has
several advantages which could be detrimental to the sector in the long run.  Especially in this
weak regulatory  environment with interconnection problems reported by other mobiles, GT's
mobile operations raise the possibility of unfair cross-subsidies  and unequal treatment.
Figure 16: Number of Spacefone  Subscribers
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Source:  Spacefon (field survey 04/02)
An additional and ongoing problem in the imobile sector is the division and allocation of
spectrum.  In the early 1  990s the government gave a large share of spectrum to Mobitel, which
35was the only operator at the time.  It later took back spectrum to give to Spacefon and others.  At
that point Mobitel had 15 MHz and Scancom had  10 MHz of spectrum.  In April  2000, the
NCA, in an attempt to resolve the spectrum disputes on GSM, re-allocated some spectrum to
accommodate  GT's mobile operations and created a reserve to be allocated to Westel or the
company that manages  to  increase its subscriber base to warrant additional frequency.  The lack
of a coherent spectrum policy has clearly created  a great deal of confusion and uncertainty.
While the government probably made a mistake early on in giving away a valuable natural
resource-spectrum-simply  taking that spectrum back without a coherent plan created more
uncertainty,  since it raises the possibility that spectrum allocated one day may be taken back the
next.
(iv)  Government interference. While the central government expresses  its desire for
increased activity and improvements  in the telecom  sector, not all government decisions are
consistent with this objective (as is certainly the case in many countries).  For example, the NCA
blocked Mobitel's expansion and conversion from an analogue to digital GSM network.  In 2000
the company decided to convert to a GSM system, and reportedly received approval to do so in
March  2001.  Once its equipment was in place (after an unexplained three month delay while the
equipment was held in customs), the system was finally ready to begin operations in June 2001.
Just before service was to start, however, the firm received a letter from the NCA dated July 13,
2001, denying the firm's right to operate the equipment  and instructing the firm to dismantle the
equipment and send it to the NCA for storage.  Ultimately Mobitel did not have to dismantle the
equipment but was not given permission to use it until August, 2002, when it finally launched  its
GSM service.  Under these circumstances,  Mobitel's customer base dwindled from more than
51,000 subscribers at the end of 2000 to 45,000 in April 2002.
In addition to problems with the customs agency (Scancom,  too, has had imported
equipment severely delayed there), other agencies are beginning to see the telecom sector as a
potential  source of revenue.  For example, the Accra Metropolitan  Assembly recently imposed a
new fee of 50,000 cedis per mobile telephone subscriber and 20,000 cedis per fixed line
subscriber (Accra Metropolitan Assembly 2002).  Scancom estimates that this tax will cost them
nearly $US  1 million a year.  By comparison, the city tax for a 5-star hotel is 20 million cedis.
One telecom  firm reported that many other import- and customs-related  taxes have recently been
imposed,  as well.
36Finally, the govemment seems reluctant to liberalize parts of the sector where bottlenecks
remain.  For example,  Scancom has requested its own intemational  gateway so that it does not
have to interconnect through Westel or GT to complete intemational  calls.  The NCA is reluctant
to authorize one, despite the fact that competition  in international  telephony would bring the
prospect of lower consumer prices and better access.
(iv.) Future  competition.  The exclusivity period granted to GT and Westel has now
expired, meaning that almost all aspects of telecom are open for competition.  One potential
competitor is the Volta Telecommunications  Company (Voltacom),  a subsidiary of the state-
owned electricity company, the Volta River Authority. Voltacom has a license for data
transmission and has laid fiber optic lines along the electricity network to all district capitals,
connecting with Togo and Cote d'Ivoire.  Because fiber optic is considerably  cheaper to operate
than wireless and offers higher quality service,  this investment offers the potential  to expand
access rapidly in alliance with one of the two network operators, or with a new entrant to basic
services after 2002.
Voltacom's entry would present many risks and opportunities  for the telecom sector.
One benefit would come from increased competition,  especially to outlying areas with pitifully
poor service today.  One concem is that Voltacom could, as a state-owned  finm,  be an unfair
competitor able to use its power revenues to cross-subsidize telephone service.  On the other
hand, Voltacom would be a relatively small player compared to the firms already in the market,
limiting its potential market power.  This potential entrant is another example where better
regulatory capacity could help the sector: a stronger regulator could help ensure a level playing
field to make it feasible for Voltacom to enter while simultaneously monitoring that the firm
does not act in an anticompetitive manner as it builds its own network.
Other forms of competition  are technically already possible, but have not been approved.
Intemet Protocol (IP) telephony, for example, provides a low-cost option for voice
communication,  and intemational telephony in particular.  So far, however, only GT is
authorized to provide  it.  Indeed, the owner of a local Intemet Service Provider (ISP) was
recently arrested and her equipment confiscated when the govemment accused her of making IP
telephony available through her equipment.  Whether or not IP telephony could emerge as a real
competitor to more common methods of  voice communication  is not yet clear.  Instead, the
37approach to IP telephony reveals a reluctance to allow true openness and competition, which
may not bode well for future development in the sector.
VII.  Conclusion
Privatization and competition have spurred considerable activity in Ghana, but there has
not been as much improvement in the sector as everyone hoped back in the heady early days of
reform.  These early achievements notwithstanding,  several lessons emerge  from Ghana's
experience.  First, the weakness of the NCA was not inevitable. Experience  in the Public Utilities
Commission that regulates electricity shows that an effective regulator is possible in Ghana.  The
most opportune moment to create such a regulator for telecommunications  was probably before
the sale, when the government was most concerned about establishing its reputation with
potential investors, and would have been most motivated to appoint a strong, neutral board.
Second, the process could have been designed to protect against a weak regulator, even if that
would have meant a less than optimal design from some standpoints.  For example, GT's
privatization could have been delayed until after the SNO was operating.  A less commercially-
oriented,  state-owned GT arguably would have been less effective in foreclosing entry
opportunities or acting strategically.  This would have reduced the sales price for GT, but raised
the value of the SNO license and possible could have attracted more bidders.  GT could also
have been prohibited from cellular and other wireless  entry, which would have reduced its
incentive to fight interconnection  with the mobile operators.  But this prohibition would have
reduced the value of GT even more, and may not make much sense given the disappearing
distinction between  wireless and fixed wire services.
Competition is still relatively strong in Ghana and an active and effective regulator could
still be appointed.  Experience in other countries suggests that such agencies are most able to
resist capture if their powers and responsibilities  are carefully delineated in law and regulation,
and if their procedures are transparent and give voice to opposing interests, including consumers.
It is also crucial that the regulator receive all necessary information, and that as much
information as possible-about firms subject to regulations  and government actions affecting the
industry-be shared with the public.
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